Meanwhile, and until better conditions came to light, our national strategy must focus on "Maintaining and protecting the Arab Identity of East Jerusalem by supporting the steadfastness of the city's human, spiritual, and material resources; City should be given proper tools to be able to override Israeli occupation attempts to dilute the city's character and turn it to be totally reliant on the Israeli system". The following facts must be taken into accounts when drawing our national plan for Jerusalem:

• East Jerusalem incubates the old city and several Palestinian rural, urban, and refugee residential areas. Civilians of those areas had been scattered and fractioned by the apartheid wall that placed 17% of theJerusalemites out of the cities metropolitan borders; Israeli occupation aims for a major demographic change that would bring the racial balance between the Arabs and Jews in 2020 to become 12% Arabs against 86 % Jews.     
   
• The wall that is designed to swallow 72 square km from the Arab Jerusalemite lands has already consumed 26 square km of those areas; the wall and the introduced regulations and limitations have divided the Jerusalemites into two groups, a group with blue ID cards that are permitted to continue to reside in Jerusalem, and a group with West Bank ID cards that are denied any of the rights and benefits of the citizens of Jerusalem. Second group includes citizens of Al Izariyyah neighborhood, Abu Dis, Sawahreh, Anata, Hizma, sheikh Saied, Walageh, and the seven villages in the north- eastern basin of Jerusalem.
• Jerusalemites, although claimed to be in a better off status than west bankers, appear to be badly affected by the Israeli restricting regulations, the “blue ID cards” given to them might provide them with better mobility and with Israeli national security services, but on the other hand they are burdened with different types of taxes that reaches to about 33% of their incomes. Jerusalem municipality from its part spends only 8% of the cities services budget on the Arabs areas in the city.
• According to the Israeli National security statistics for the past two years, 60% of the Arab families in Jerusalem are under poverty line. Work opportunities available for women are very scarce and do not meet their educational and professional level.  Arab women that need to start their private projects face so many obstacles and are hindered from applying for loans because of the high interests they have to pay and for the risks they need to take.
• Jerusalem women societies that provides vocational training are sticking to traditional jobs that do always meet the market demands, and when women approach the Israeli labor office for help, they are normally offered low standard jobs and lower salaries; domestic cleaning and farming are by large the jobs to be kept for Arab women.
• Regulations regarding house building or house expansions have led Jerusalemite families to be squeezed in small areas and crowded houses; the case is most obvious within the old city of Jerusalem. The Israeli settlements in and around the city were given massive lands from the Arab neighborhoods of Silwan, sheikh Jarrah, Shu’fat, Bet Hanina, and nabi Samoi’el in the old city; all on the expense of the Arabs areas and properties.  
• The above social and financial problems were the main factors behind spread of social illnesses like dropping of girls from schools, early marriages, drugs and prostitution, honor killing, and environmental pollution.
• The Arab society in Jerusalem abstains from taking part in the formal Israeli political life; this also applies for women that have not been involved in the political life of the city and can’t participate in the political life in the West Bank as well because of their special status. 
• In the 2005 Palestinian general elections, Israeli warning measures have prevented most Jerusalemites from taking part; only one woman from Jerusalem was elected for the Palestinian Legislative Council.
• A year ago, the National Conference for Jerusalem was formed to be the main reference body for the Arab people of Jerusalem; only 15% of the elected members were women.

• In general, evaluation found out that women members in big cities’ councils have registered better achievements than their colleagues in small rural and marginalized localities; this is partially due to personal capabilities and to social and cultural factors.
• Some women have been fully engaged in issues related to their posts, while most have limited themselves to issues related to the gender needs and interests; this was either because those women have narrow vision or because they were hindered by their mail colleagues that limited their area of work.
• At some stage, and due to the internal political dispute that erupted in the Palestinian areas after 2006, several local council members have resigned; women members were the most to resign and their move came individually sometimes, and as part of a collective measure by council members at other times.
• In several cases, resignations of women came because they were put under pressure by other members; council meetings were held at night or at times not suitable at all for mothers- members of council. Some women members stated that male colleagues used to meet behind their back. They discussed important issues and reach resolutions then bring papers to their female colleagues to sign; women claimed that an elimination policy had been followed against them.
• With regards to failures and successes, it had been noticed that women’s delivery was not isolated from the delivery of their councils; in successful councils women did well, and in falling councils their participation was below standard.

• The fact that general political disputes prevented the council from holding regular meeting and discussions.
• The drift between the council members that took the institute towards deep internal confrontations have paralyzed the council and destroyed all prospects of achievements by its members. Women members’ however were by large part of that confrontation, and did not put enough effort to narrow the gap between members or to search for common ground that could have united all members; small group of independent members spread a unifying massage within council , but their voices were hardly heard. 
• Some women members from Hamas were detained by the Israeli occupation forces.
• Women members, by large have chosen to work and be involved in their local communities within the framework of their political parties- not according to their Parliamentary blocks; this was not always seen as a negative element as some members- especially in the West Bank were able to deliver strong political and humanitarian massages on Palestine to the Arab and International community.

• Women leaders by large withdrew from the political parties and joined the flourishing NGO’s that appeared to form better platforms for them at a certain stage. 
• Some women activists decided to establish social centers and institutes as opposed to parties’ women organizations; step was seen as a trial activity in their quest to regain their fading power and influence.
• The expanding influence of Hamas and other Islamic groups led to surfacing of social and cultural centers related to those groups; although women’s status within those parties is not clear to us, it is obvious that large scale of the Palestinian women were employed by the parties affiliated bodies. Hamas was able to introduce quite a good number of women for the PLC elections.
• Retreat of the democratic programs of most political parties have led those parties to age and prevented the natural flow of new generation and new ideas to their premises. Fateh- the bigger and most influential movement appeared to be the most retreating. Absence of internal and organizational elections has driven younger generations away from the movement; young women in particular have shown less interest in joining such political bodies.
•  The women leaders themselves were partially responsible for the retreat of the women’s political role as they did not put the needed effort to take them to higher positions; they did not show enough enthusiasm and did not lift their self capability to persuade the society of their abilities in leadership.
• Historically, women were given some leading positions in Fateh and some of the leftist parties like the PFLP and PDFLP. They were also given leading positions in some of the trade and youth unions. However, in most cases women’s presence appeared to be a decorative measure rather than functional. This is not to say that women in leading positions did not fight hard to prove their points, but rather to encourage them to work even harder to pave the way for the young generation of women.